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1. Introduction 
 
The setting of presidential term limits is one of the democratic rules widely 
institutionalised in Africa since the late 1980s (Bogaards 2014: 38; Cheeseman 2015: 
176–182; Reyntjens 2016; Posner and Young 2018). Among the 42 African presidents 
who completed their terms between 1975 and mid-2018, 20 of them complied with their 
term limits and retired, and the remaining 22 sought to stay in office beyond their tenures 
by overruling the term limits (McKie 2019: Appendix A). Among those who tried to 
overrule the term limits, 10 succeeded in abolishing them, eight extended for one term, 
and four failed in their attempts and merely retired. For example, the presidential term 
limit was removed from the Constitution of Uganda in 2005. This enabled the Ugandan 
President Yoweri Museveni to remain in power beyond the presidential term limit by 
running and winning in elections consecutively in 2006, 2011 and 2016 (Dulani 2011: 9–
11; KcKie 2019: 1508–1509; IFES). 
On the other hand, there are African countries where dominant-party systems 
have been established while presidents have adhered to term limits and changed regularly. 
These countries are located in the eastern and southern part of the continent; namely, 
Tanzania, Namibia, Mozambique, Botswana and South Africa (Takeuchi 2016: 43: 
Tsubura 2019a; Tsubura 2019b).1 While the countries where presidents have overruled 
presidential term limits (e.g. Uganda) and the aforementioned five dominant-party states 
with regular presidential succession are similarly governed by the same ruling parties for 
a long time, the characteristics of their rule are fundamentally different. The rule of the 
former is characterised by a concentration of the executive power in the hands of 
presidents (i.e. personal rule), while the latter is characterised by the control of power by 
the ruling parties (i.e. party-based rule). 
In contrast to the countries where powerful presidents remain in power beyond 
term limits, presidential term limits in dominant-party states appear to have helped ruling 
parties maintain their long-term rule. This is done by securing leadership rotation among 
the powerful ruling elites, motivating them to remain united within ruling parties while 
waiting for their turn to vie for the presidency from the parties. A notable example of this 
kind of leadership rotation guaranteed by a presidential term limit is the Partido 
Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party: PRI) in Mexico. In 1929, 
the PRI incorporated powerful revolutionary warlords with the promise made by its 
                                                        
1 A party system is considered dominant when the same party has secured an absolute majority of 
parliamentary seats in three consecutive elections. See more details on the definitions of dominant-
party systems in Tsubura (forthcoming: 3–4). 
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founder, President Plutarco Elias Calles, to retire from the presidency after one term so 
that other leaders would be given the opportunity to run for the presidency (Magaloni 
2008: 726). Thus, the question arises whether African-dominant parties have also 
strategically introduced presidential term limits to establish a leadership rotation 
mechanism within their parties and maintain its dominant rule under the multi-party 
system. 
To address the question, the present paper analyses how presidential term limits 
were introduced in four dominant-party states in Africa; namely, Tanzania, Namibia, 
Mozambique and Botswana. In these countries, presidents are changed regularly to 
examine whether the introduction of presidential term limits is aimed at establishing a 
party-based rule by the ruling parties through the guarantee of internal leadership rotation 
and the maintenance of party coherence. South Africa, the other example of a dominant-
party state with regular presidential succession, was excluded from this paper because 
while there are general studies on their constitution-making process after the end of the 
apartheid in 1994, the available secondary sources on the inclusion of the two five-year 
terms of the president in their 1996 constitution are too limited to assess the intentions 
behind it. 
 Through the analysis of the background of introducing presidential term limits 
in the four countries, the paper suggests that its aims vary among the said countries. 
Furthermore, party-based rule was established not merely because of the adoption of 
presidential term limits but by other factors over time. The present paper also suggests 
that, as part of a broader constitutional reform, term limits were sometimes critical 
concessions made by the presidents and ruling parties who faced urgent needs to 
incorporate opposition forces in the new governing system of their countries. 
 The present paper is organised into five sections. Following the introduction, the 
second section reviews the related literature on presidential term limits in emerging 
democracies and presents the research question of this paper. The third section examines 
the introduction of presidential term limits in the four dominant-party states in Africa. 
The fourth section analyses the similarities and differences among the five cases 
discussed in the previous sections. Lastly, the fifth section presents the conclusion of the 
paper. 
 
2. Effects of Presidential Term Limits on Emerging Democracies 
 
Presidential term limits are ‘constitutional provisions that restrict the maximum length of 
time that presidents can serve in office’ (Baturo and Elgie 2019: 1). While many countries 
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in Latin America have set a single term for presidency, countries in Africa, Middle East 
and Asia tend to have two terms (McKie 2019: 1501). A number of African countries have 
introduced presidential term limits since the arrival of the ‘third wave’ of democratisation 
in the late 1980s. Forty nine out of 55 constitutions in Africa with stipulated presidential 
term limits ever since their independence have adopted them after 1990 (Dulani 2011: 
133). 
Presidential term limits are recognised as a democratic rule or law across the 
world, and its introduction was frequently part of broader constitutional reforms or the 
formulation of new constitutions in emerging democracies (Baturo and Elgie 2019: 8). 
However, since the adoption of presidential term limits, some presidents in Africa have 
attempted to stay in power beyond their tenures by amending the constitutions. Because 
of this phenomenon, presidential term limits have been increasingly receiving scholarly 
attention. Some studies explore the conditions under which presidents seek to revoke 
presidential term limits and their respective outcomes. For example, Posner and Young 
(2018: 270–273) analyse how African leaders have responded to presidential term limits 
and demonstrate that the age and popularity of presidents, the level of aid dependence and 
the impact of whether previous presidents adhered to term limits are factors that explain 
why presidents may seek to secure third terms in Africa. They contend that African 
countries have become polarised into two groups: ‘those where term limits have been 
respected in the past, and where they will in all likelihood continue to be respected in the 
future’ (Posner and Young 2018: 275) and ‘those where there is no history of abiding by 
term limits and where the prospects for initiating such a history are poor’ (Posner and 
Young 2018: 275). 
Other scholars highlight the importance of electoral and party politics in the 
trajectories of presidential term limits. By comparing Kenya, Uganda and Zambia, 
Cheeseman (2019) argues that ‘the extent of organized opposition parties … and the 
ability of the president to enforce unity within the ruling party’ (313) are the two most 
important factors that determine whether term limits are being challenged or upheld in 
these countries. McKie (2019) examines the outcomes of the presidents’ attempts to 
overrule term limits in emerging democracies by highlighting their co-partisan legislators 
and constitutional court judges, who have the ultimate power to rule on term limit 
amendments. She argues that the two actors decide on whether to agree or not on the 
amendments based on recent trends in electoral competition. From the analysis of all the 
221 presidents who completed their terms in the countries governed by presidential or 
semi-presidential systems in Latin America, sub-Saharan and North Africa, the Middle 
East and Asia from 1975 to mid-2018, she argues that non-competitive elections are likely 
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to lead to full abolition, less competitive elections allowing for one-term extensions, and 
competitive elections failed bids (McKie 2019: 1500). 
The aforementioned studies focusing on the conditions under which presidents 
seek to overrule term limits in Africa and other parts of the world are all based on the 
shared understanding that term limits matter for elections and democracy. There are two 
competing explanations regarding the effects of presidential term limits on democracy. 
The first explanation is that term limits increase the likelihood of electoral transfers of 
power in presidential systems because of significant advantages held by incumbent 
presidents (e.g. Malz 2007; Cheeseman 2010; Bleck and van de Walle 2019: 70). When 
presidents do not run again in elections because of term limits or other reasons, ruling 
parties tend to struggle in selecting their successors, sometimes resulting in serious party 
splits that benefit opposition parties in the elections. This argument is supported by Maltz 
(2007) who demonstrates that, out of 88 elections in electoral authoritarian regimes, 
incumbents have won 93 percent of 67 elections, while their successors have won only 
52 percent of 21 elections (134). Cheeseman (2010) added that half of all electoral 
transfers of power in Africa between 1990 and 2009 occurred in open-seat elections 
wherein new incumbent presidents did not contest (140). Some other scholars more 
broadly examine the relationship between respect for presidential term limits and 
democracy. Reyntjens (2016), for example, explore the relationship between presidential 
term limits and the quality of democracy in African countries. He posits that the quality 
of democracy affects whether term limits are respected in the region or not (66). 
The other explanation regarding the effects of presidential term limits on 
democracy is that they have promoted leadership rotation only at the intraparty level 
without increasing the likelihood for opposition parties to win elections. This 
phenomenon is exemplified by Tanzania (Dulani 2011: 190, LeBas 2016: 172), South 
Africa (Cheeseman 2015: 181) and Mozambique (LeBas 2016: 172). LeBas (2016) 
argues that presidential term limits can coexist with authoritarian rule by dominant parties 
without any prospects of electoral turnovers, as long as the ruling parties manage internal 
successions well (172). Indeed, eight out of 20 African presidents who respected term 
limits between 1975 and mid-2018 were leaders in dominant-party states without 
electoral turnovers (McKie 2019: Appendix A). Thus, the present paper suggests that the 
meanings of presidential term limits in dominant-party states with regular presidential 
succession should be examined separately from that of the countries that have 
experienced electoral transfers of power, as well as from dominant-party states without 
regular presidential succession because of term-limit contraventions. 
The mechanism of coexistence of presidential term limits and stable dominant-
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party rule is partly explicated in Magaloni’s analysis of the PRI’s dominant rule in Mexico 
that lasted from 1929 to 2000 (Magaloni 2006; Magaloni 2008). In 1929, President 
Plutarco Elias Calles, founder of the PRI, made a power-sharing deal with other 
revolutionary warlords by promising that he would not re-run for the presidency after 
serving for one term. Since then, presidential succession has taken place in the 
presidential election every six years in Mexico. The regular presidential succession 
provided incentives to the elites within the ruling coalition to remain in the PRI to wait 
for their turn, instead of plotting a removal of the incumbent presidents through illegal 
means (Magaloni 2008: 726). Furthermore, the rule of non-consecutive re-election for all 
elective offices, including presidents, was introduced in 1933 which provided ambitious 
PRI politicians ample opportunities to contest in the elections, establishing a constant 
rotation of political elites in government offices (Magaloni 2006: 17; Ugalde 2000: 98–
99). 
The disadvantage of the non-consecutive re-election rule was that the PRI faced 
challenges in maintaining party unity in selecting new candidates before upcoming 
elections every six years. Indeed, the PRI frequently experienced major splits, especially 
in 1940, 1946, 1952 and 1987 when its presidential candidates were opposed by 
prominent party leaders (Magaloni 2006: 17). According to Magaloni (2006: 8–18), the 
PRI developed three main mechanisms to maintain party unity: first was creating an 
image of invincibility by winning elections through a landslide victory, thereby 
discouraging potential divisions within the ruling party; second was by distributing ample 
spoils and government jobs to the ruling elites and third was raising the cost of entry for 
potential challengers by manipulating electoral rules and threatening to commit electoral 
fraud by force. 
Drawing on Magaloni’s examination of the PRI’s dominant rule, the present 
paper analyses how and why presidential term limits were introduced in the four 
dominant-party states with regular presidential succession. This was done to examine 
whether it was aimed at establishing a party-based rule by guaranteeing leadership 
rotation and maintaining party coherence to continue to win multi-party elections. The 
PRI’s case suggests that the adoption of a presidential term limit was a concession made 
by the party leader to incorporate rival forces. The analysis in the next section suggests 
that the introduction of presidential term limits in some of the four dominant-party states 
in Africa was a concession made by presidents to accommodate opposition forces outside 
their parties in the new political systems of their countries. 
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3. Introduction of Presidential Term Limits in Four Dominant-party States in 
Africa 
 
The historical background of the introduction of presidential term limits significantly 
varies among the aforementioned four dominant-party states with regular presidential 
succession. Presidents are elected directly by citizens in Tanzania, Namibia and 
Mozambique, while Botswana is governed by a parliamentary system where the president 
is elected by the National Assembly after each legislative election (Reynolds, Reilly and 
Ellis 2008). The following analysis of the introduction of presidential term limits in the 
four countries is arranged in order of the year of their adoption of term limits: Tanzania 
(1987), Namibia (1989), Mozambique (1990) and Botswana (1997). 
 
3.1. Tanzania: Presidential term limit for leadership rotation after the first 
president’s retirement 
 
Only six out of 98 constitutions enacted in Africa before 1990 had presidential term limits, 
and Tanzania’s constitution was one of them. Tanzania set the presidential tenure for two 
five-year terms in 1984, under the leadership of the first President Julius Nyerere during 
the socialist one-party period (Dulani 2011: 64). The introduction of the term limit can be 
considered part of Nyerere’s retirement plan provided that Nyerere, who had been 
Tanzania’s president since 1962, retired from the presidency one year after the inclusion 
of the presidential term limit in the constitution. Some scholars contend that Tanzania’s 
constitutional amendment in 1984 signifies a shift from Nyerere’s personal rule to an 
institutionalised presidential system in the country (Mutahaba and Okema 1990: 65–66). 
However, other scholars disagree on the institutionalisation effect of the constitutional 
amendments as Nyerere remained influential in the country, being the chairman of the 
ruling party Chama Cha Mapinduzi (Party of Revolution: CCM) for five years after his 
retirement from the presidency. This continued even after he handed over the party 
chairmanship to his successor, President Ali Hassan Mwinyi, in 1990 (Dulani 2011: 191; 
Baturo 2014: 57; Kalley, Schoeman and Andor 1999: 631). 
 The constitutional changes in Tanzania have largely responded to the political 
evolution of the country since its independence in 1961, particularly in association with 
the union between Tanzania mainland, known as Tanganyika, and Zanzibar, constituting 
the islands off the coast of Tanzania. The Constitution of the Republic of Tanzania of 
1962 was amended to the 1965 Interim Constitution, which formalised the United 
Republic of Tanzania through the merger between Tanganyika and Zanzibar in 1964. The 
    
10 
 
Constitution was amended again in 1977 following the merger between Tanganyika 
African National Union and Afro-Shirazi Party, which were the ruling parties in 
Tanganyika and Zanzibar, respectively to form the CCM in 1977. This Constitution was 
further amended in 1980 to take into account the political changes in Zanzibar with the 
establishment of a more representative government structure through the adoption of the 
1979 Zanzibar Constitution (Nyanduga 1985). 
 The fourth constitutional amendment enacted by the National Assembly in 1984 
was based on the proposals issued by the CCM National Executive Committee to provide 
‘democratic safeguards within the context of a one-party democracy and … to guarantee 
the socialist goals to which Tanzania is committed’ (Nyanduga 1985). One of the 
intentions for the new amendments was to further integrate Zanzibar into the union. 
Furthermore, the demand for greater autonomy of Zanzibar was discussed through 
constitutional negotiations (Campbell, Stein and Samoff 1992: 55). 
President Nyerere took the lead in introducing the presidential term limit for two 
terms by submitting the proposal to the CCM National Executive Committee in 1984, 
which was later accepted by the party and the parliament. Thus, unlike many other African 
countries, the introduction of the presidential term limit in Tanzania was not part of its 
democratisation. In 1984, Nyerere announced that he would not run for the next 
presidential election in 1985, allegedly in response to a request to him by the Dar es 
Salaam Elders Advisory Council to serve another five-year term. He argued for the 
supremacy of the CCM, and not individual leaders, which would create stability and 
facilitate the smooth succession of leadership. He also sought to institutionalise the 
method of transferring power by allowing the outgoing president to retain party 
chairmanship, which the new president would succeed later (Mutahaba and Okema 1990: 
72, 75). In proposing the introduction of the presidential tenure, Nyerere emphasised that 
presidents should not be the ones to decide when to leave their office. It was because 
presidents who are encouraged to stay in power by their followers with personal interests 
are likely to end up becoming harmful dictators due to ‘corruption of power’(Msekwa 
2019). 
In selecting Nyerere’s successor, he preferred somebody from Zanzibar at the 
meetings of the CCM Central Committee and the National Executive Committee in 
August 1984. After deliberations within the party, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, the CCM Vice 
President from Zanzibar, was selected as Nyerere’s successor (Mutahaba and Okema 
1990: 73). This implies that the introduction of the presidential term limit was part of 
Nyerere’s strategy to integrate the ruling elites in Zanzibar into the mechanism of 
leadership rotation within the CCM, while maintaining a power balance between 
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Tanzania mainland and Zanzibar. Nyerere’s selection of his successor from Zanzibar 
seems to have been aimed at accommodating the Zanzibari ruling elites to facilitate its 
peaceful integration into Tanzania. Moreover, the power of his successor was constrained 
by the term limit so that future opportunities to rule the countries were guaranteed for the 
leaders in Tanzania mainland. Thus, it can be argued that the introduction of the 
presidential term limit in Tanzania was aimed at establishing a mechanism of leadership 
rotation within the ruling party. 
While Nyerere’s three successors did not openly challenge the term limit, there 
was still one unsuccessful attempt to extend his tenure—such was when the President 
Mwinyi’s two terms in office approached its end in 1991. Mwinyi’s close allies proposed 
constitutional amendments to remove the term limit to enable him to run for a third term 
in office. Nyerere strongly opposed it through the CCM National Executive Committee 
and thwarted Mwinyi’s proposal. Consequently, Prime Minister John Malecela and CCM 
Secretary General Horace Kolimba were forced to resign from their positions (Baturo 
2014: 188, Msekwa Daily News 24 October 2019). Subsequently, Nyerere selected 
Benjamin Mkapa as Mwinyi’s successor and even campaigned for Mkapa’s candidacy 
within the CCM (Tsubura 2017: 6). With CCM’s control over the attempt to extend 
Mwinyi’s tenure, the presidential term limit was no longer challenged either by Mkapa 
or his successor, Jakaya Kikwete. 
 In sum, the introduction of a presidential term limit in Tanzania by the strong 
initiative of President Nyerere was aimed at establishing a leadership rotation mechanism 
among CCM leaders in Tanzania mainland and Zanzibar after his retirement from office. 
Since the attempt by the allies of Nyerere’s successor to challenge the term limit was 
thwarted, a party-based rule was established within the CCM. 
 
3.2. Namibia: Presidential term limit as a concession to facilitate the independent 
process 
 
In Namibia, a presidential term limit for two five-year terms was included in its 
constitution that was drafted one year before its independence from South Africa in 1990. 
It was one of the concessions made by the ruling party, South West Africa People’s 
Organisation (SWAPO), to the main opposition party that was against the formation of 
executive presidency in constitutional negotiations. Such concession was made because 
of the SWAPO’s urgent need to achieve independence (Cliffe and Pankhurst 2013: 82). 
However, as it turned out, Namibia became a rare case in two-term regimes that allowed 
an ad-hoc extension of one term for the first president; President Sam Nujoma amended 
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the constitution and served for a third term (Melber 2006: 98; Melber 2015: 52). Nujoma 
even contemplated a fourth term but declared his resignation in 2004 and handed over the 
executive power to his hand-picked successor, Hifikepunye Pohamba, in the following 
year (Elischer 2013:127–128). Given Nujoma’s extension of his presidential tenure, it 
was unlikely that the introduction of a presidential term limit was originally aimed at 
establishing a party-based rule by facilitating a leadership rotation within the SWAPO. 
As part of the independence process, members of the Constituent Assembly that 
would draft a constitution for Namibia were selected through a fully open election in 
November 1989. The SWAPO obtained a majority of 43 (57%) out of the total 72 seats 
in the election, but it was short of the two-thirds majority necessary for the final vote on 
the draft constitution as a whole (Cliffe 1994: 1, 183, 199). All the seven parties 
participating in the Constituent Assembly formally presented their drafts of the 
constitution, and the main opposition party, Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), 
requested for a public debate on constitutional principles. Furthermore, the areas of 
agreement and disagreement were negotiated in the Standing Committee on Rules and 
Orders in camera, which was attended by representatives of all the parties in December 
1989 and January 1990. While it was unanimously agreed that the SWAPO’s 
constitutional proposal would be used as the basic document for deliberations in the 
committee, significant changes were made to the said document after several discussions 
(Cliffe 1994: 201–202). 
One of the contentious areas discussed in the committee meetings was the role 
of the executive president. While the DTA representative expressed a concern regarding 
executive presidency, the SWAPO expected that its founder, Sam Nujoma, would be the 
first president. They argued that the president should be directly elected by the citizens as 
‘a father figure … [and] a symbol of authority of the nation’ (Cliffe 1994: 203). The 
SWAPO succeeded in maintaining their position that the president must be directly 
elected by citizens in the final constitution. However, the SWAPO still compromised and 
agreed to significantly modify the president’s role from what it originally proposed. Part 
of the modifications was the introduction of the presidential term limit for two five-year 
terms to facilitate the process of achieving independence. Achieving independence was 
urgent for the SWAPO, as it was running out of financial resources to support its party 
members who had been waiting to be allocated positions in the new government. With 
this, the SWAPO may have even thought about changing the constitution after achieving 
independence (Cliffe 1994: 203–213). 
Nujoma was elected as the first Namibian president by the Constituent Assembly, 
and Namibia later achieved independence in 1990 (Melber 2015: 50). Although his 
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presidency was constitutionally limited for two five-year terms, he served for a third term 
on the ground that he was elected by the members of the Constituent Assembly under the 
supervision of the United Nations before independence and not directly by citizens 
(Melber 2006: 98). The SWAPO was able to amend the constitution after obtaining 53 
out of the 72 seats in the first parliamentary election in 1994, which was more than the 
two-thirds majority required for constitutional amendment (African Election Database). 
Furthermore, the extension of Nujoma’s presidency was not a major dispute in the public 
sphere. Thus, an exception was made to the rule that only the first president was entitled 
to serve for a third term without amending the term limit clause in the constitution (Melber 
2006: 98, 104: Baturo 2014: 63). In 2001, President Nujoma stated that he would consider 
serving for a fourth term if people in Namibia wanted him to stay in power beyond the 
prescribed term limit (Mail and Guardian 2001). However, the SWAPO announced that 
Nujoma would not run for a fourth term in 2003, and he publicly declared his decision to 
resign at the end of his third term in the following year (BBC 2003; Elischer 2013: 127). 
Although Nujoma’s third-term bid led to the first defection of a seminar member 
of the SWAPO, it did not seriously threaten the SWAPO’s dominance in the elections. 
Ben Ulenga, Namibia’s High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, resigned from his 
position by openly criticising Nujoma’s renewed bid for the presidency. Consequently, 
Ulenga was suspended from SWAPO’s Central Committee and formed a new opposition 
party, the Congress of Democrats (CoD), with the support of several former ministers and 
high-ranking civil servants. Since CoD was the first opposition party whose founders 
were former SWAPO members who had fought for Namibia’s independence, the SWAPO 
actively campaigned against the CoD in the 1999 elections by calling Ulenga a traitor of 
the liberalisation struggle (Elischer 2013: 120–125). The SWAPO’s dominance was not 
threatened by Ulenga and the CoD; they only gained 10% of votes in the presidential and 
legislative elections in 1999 and 7% of votes in the elections in 2004 (African Election 
Database). Nonetheless, the defection may have contributed to the SWAPO’s decision to 
change its leadership, instead of allowing Nujoma to run for a fourth term. 
 In sum, the introduction of a presidential term limit in Namibia was a concession 
made by the ruling party, SWAPO, in constitutional negotiations to facilitate the 
independence process and to immediately seize the reins of power. Given Nujoma’s 
extension of one term and his contemplation of a fourth term, the introduction of a 
presidential term limit does not seem to have originally been aimed at establishing a party-
based rule by guaranteeing internal leadership rotation. Nujoma handed over the 
executive power to his hand-picked successor, Pohamba, only after he lost support from 
the SWAPO elite for his fourth term of presidency. In completing his two terms, President 
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Pohamba respected the term limit and secretly campaigned within the SWAPO for Hage 
Geingob to be his successor (Tsubura 2019b: 12–13). Since then, a leadership rotation 
mechanism seems to have been established within the SWAPO. 
 
3.3. Mozambique: Presidential term limit as part of a liberation reform to end the 
conflict 
 
In Mozambique, the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frente de Libertação de 
Moçambique [FRELIMO]) has maintained its dominant rule since the first multi-party 
elections held in 1994. This was the result of a peace agreement signed in 1992 by 
President Joachim Chissano and Afonso Dhlakama, leader of the Mozambican National 
Resistance (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana [RENAMO]). The presidential tenure 
for three five-year terms was introduced in Mozambique through its constitutional 
amendment in 1990. It was part of the liberalisation reform to end the conflict between 
the FRELIMO and the RENAMO that lasted for 15 years. Backed by the white minority 
government in South Africa, the RENAMO was strongly against the FRELIMO’s attempt 
to build a socialist country. Led by President Chissano, a dramatic shift from socialist to 
liberal ideologies in the 1990 constitution was partly aimed at curtailing the RENAMO’s 
claim for democracy (Hall and Young 1991). Although two Mozambican presidents, 
Chissano and his successor, Armando Guebuza, sought to re-run for the presidency within 
the FRELIMO, their attempts were rejected by senior leaders of the party (Tsubura 2019b: 
14–15). 
 After Mozambique’s independence from Portugal in 1975, the FRELIMO 
government adopted Marxism–Leninism as a guiding ideology in 1997 and governed the 
country by emulating the framework of Soviet-type regimes. However, in 1989, a 
decision was made at the FRELIMO Congress to replace the socialist ideology by liberal 
principles. Furthermore, it was decided at the Assembly of the Popular Republic that the 
Constitution, which was formulated at the independence in 1975, would be revised to 
reflect the said changes in principles. The new constitution, adopted in 1989 and 
published in 1990, made no reference to socialism but rather provides for a ‘liberal 
understanding of the state and politics, with a separation of powers and an opening of the 
way for multiparty democracy’ (Morier-Genoud 2009: 155). 
The constitutional amendment in 1990 was characterised by President 
Chisanno’s strategy to end the civil war while simultaneously containing the RENAMO’s 
influence in the new political system (Morier-Genoud 2009: 155–156). By the late 1980s, 
the conflict had destroyed the national economy, and the government had lost control over 
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large part of the countryside. With this, President Chissano and the FRELIMO 
government sought to accommodate the RENAMO by inviting its leaders to participate 
in negotiations when the preparation to amend the constitution began in 1986. However, 
the RENAMO preferred a power-sharing arrangement, which the FRELIMO tried to 
avoid. Without the RENAMO’s participation in the constitutional negotiations, the 1990 
constitution had advantages for the FRELIMO’s rule. The proposed draft was aimed at 
democratising the country and stipulated that the president would directly be elected by 
citizens for a five-year term that could be renewed twice. Because of the dramatic 
ideological shift in the constitution, the justification of the RENAMO and its Western 
sympathisers to fight for democracy was undermined (Hall and Young 1990: 107–114; 
Morier-Genoud 2009: 155–156). 
Since the constitutional amendments in 1990, leadership succession within the 
FRELIMO has been characterised by collective management by the party elites with 
strong influence from former freedom fighters in the struggle for independence. Even the 
power of the incumbent and former presidents is constrained by the FRELIMO elite. 
FRELIMO has been inclusive of potential dissidents through co-optation, and it has no 
experience of defections by senior party members. Furthermore, the competition with a 
strong opposition party, the RENAMO, and the fragile political environment during the 
post-conflict period all seem to have contributed to enforcing solidarity of the FRELIMO 
leaders (Tsubura 2019b: 13–17). 
While Chissano was elected in 1994 and re-elected in 1999, he won by only a 
margin of less than 5% in 1999. In these elections, he garnered 52% of the votes, while 
RENAMO’s candidate, Dhlakama, only obtained 48%. Chissano and the FRELIMO lost 
electoral support, particularly from the rural areas and from the centre and north of the 
country where the economic situation was deteriorating (PanAfrican News Agency 9 May 
2011; Morier-Genoud 2009: 158). Against this backdrop, although Chissano was eligible 
to serve for the third term of presidency under the 1990 constitution, and having sought 
to re-run for the presidency in 2004, his attempt was allegedly rejected by the FRELIMO 
leaders. FRELIMO was concerned that Chissano and the party might only lose the 
forthcoming elections. After the presidential tenure was shortened to only two five-year 
terms in 2004, Guebuza sought to extend his tenure by repealing the said term limit, but 
this was yet again rejected by the FRELIMO to provide opportunities to the younger party 
leaders (Think Africa Press 2012). 
In sum, the introduction of the presidential term limit in Mozambique in 1990 
was part of the liberalisation reform to end the conflict between the FRELIMO and the 
RENAMO. Here, the intentions of President Chissano to establish a leadership rotation 
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mechanism within the FRELIMO were uncertain. However, Mozambique still came to 
be characterised by a party-based rule with collective management of leadership 
succession by the party elites, partnered with strong party coherence over time. 
 
3.4. Botswana: Presidential term limit for leadership rotation after President 
Masire’s retirement 
 
Botswana is one of the two African countries where multi-party elections have been held 
without interruptions since its independence in 1966. The presidential term limit was 
introduced as part of constitutional reform in 1997, after over thirty years of dominant 
rule by Botswana Democratic Party (BDP). Initiated by President Ketumile Masire, the 
presidential term limit was adopted against the background that the BDP had been riven 
by factional infighting and declining electoral support partly due to corruption scandals 
involving cabinet members in the 1990s (Good and Taylor 2006: 55). 
Masire was sworn in as President following the death of the first Botswanan 
President Seretse Khama in 1980. The BDP won the following legislative elections of 
1984, 1989 and 1994 with Masire being re-elected as the President by the National 
Assembly each time. Although the presidential term was generally five years long that 
coincided with the tenure of parliament, neither the presidential term nor the number of 
re-elections was stipulated in the constitution before the constitutional amendments in 
1997. In case the president dies or resigns, the legislature was to elect a new president 
within seven days (Otlhogile 1998: 215–216). 
Under the leadership of President Masire, the BDP was seriously affected by an 
internal split into two factions in the 1990s. One group was led by the BDP Secretary 
General Daniel Kwelagobe and Chariman Ponatshego, who largely represented the old 
elites. The other group was led by Minister of Foreign Affairs Mompati Merafhe, mainly 
supported by the newcomers and reformists (Tsubura 2019b: 8). With this, the BDP’s 
support rate continued to decline from 68% in 1984 to 53% in 1994. Conversely, the main 
opposition party, Botswana National Front (BNF), increased its vote share steadily from 
20% in 1989 to 38% in 1994 (African Election Database). 
The constitutional amendments in 1997 facilitated the smooth transition of 
presidential power from Masire to his hand-picked successor by introducing two reforms 
regarding the presidency. The first reform was setting of the presidential term limit for 
two five-year terms (Good and Taylor 2006: 53–55). The second reform was addition of 
the stipulation that the vice president, who was appointed by the president, would 
automatically succeeded the president in case of the president’s death or resignation to 
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ensure a smooth succession (Republic of Botswana 2006; Morton, Ramsay and Mgadla 
2008: xix; Maundeni and Seabo 2015: 30). BDP’s constitution was also amended so that 
its presidential candidates would be selected at the party’s special congress during 
election years. Yet, such a congress has never been convened, as Masire and his two 
successors have resigned from office before the end of their terms, and their appointed 
vice presidents automatically succeeded the presidency as described below (Maundeni 
and Seabo 2015: 30; Weekend Post 2018). 
Following the 1997 constitutional amendments, President Masire retired from 
office in 1998, one year before the end of his two five-year terms, and Vice President 
Festus Mogae, who was appointed by Masire in 1992, automatically succeeded the 
presidency. Masire arguably decided to retire early from the presidency to avoid two 
scenarios: first, given the growing challenges posed on the BDP’s dominance by the BNF 
in the 1990s, the BDP might have lost the forthcoming legislative election if its leadership 
had not been changed; second, if a special congress had been convened within the BDP, 
one of the two factional leaders might have been chosen as his successor, which might 
cause a party split by defection of the defeated leader and his followers. As such, the 
introduction of the presidential term limit and the rule of automatic presidential 
succession to the vice president in 1997 can be considered as part of Masire’s strategy to 
facilitate his retirement from the presidency while simultaneously mitigating the impacts 
of factional politics on the BDP. Masire retired on favourable terms and played an active 
role as a former president, receiving international recognition afterward. Masire’s two 
successors, Mogae and Ian Khama, followed suit and retired from the presidency one year 
before the end of their two terms in office, in 2008 and 2018, respectively. Following their 
retirements, the vice presidents they had appointed automatically succeeded the 
presidency. This custom resulted in alienation of the parliament and the party elites from 
BDP’s succession politics (Good and Taylor 2006). 
In sum, the introduction of a presidential term limit in Botswana was aimed at 
facilitating President Masire’s smooth retirement from office and initiating a leadership 
rotation within the BDP. However, Masire also established a mechanism of automatic 
presidential succession to vice presidents, which enabled presidential control over 
leadership succession, partially constraining a party-based rule by the BDP. 
 
4. Analysis 
 
The present paper has demonstrated that presidential term limits were introduced in four 
dominant-party states as part of either their constitutional reforms or the formulation of a 
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new constitution. The presidents who led the introduction of presidential term limits had 
intentions of achieving certain goals in their historical contexts that were not necessarily 
related to democratisation. In Tanzania, the presidential term limit was introduced during 
the one-party socialist period to ensure a leadership rotation within the ruling party, 
including the Zanzibari ruling elites, in the process of further integrating Zanzibar into 
Tanzania. In Mozambique, the presidential term limit was introduced as part of the 
liberation reform to end the conflict and to undermine the opposition’s claim for 
democracy. In Namibia, the presidential term limit was introduced in the independent 
constitution as a concession made to the main opposition party to achieve the country’s 
independence immediately. However, the first president overruled it by adding another 
term thereafter. Lastly, in Botswana, a presidential term limit was introduced as the 
president’s plan to retire from office without losing the forthcoming election. The said 
presidential term limit was adopted together with the president’s control over the selection 
of his successor to mitigate the influence of factional competition on the ruling party. 
An examination of the four dominant-party states suggests that presidential term 
limits were introduced by the presidents in Botswana and Tanzania as their retirement 
plans to set the rule for their successors. These introductions were aimed at achieving a 
leadership rotation within their parties to help them remain united. However, provided 
that both presidents exercised power in selecting their successors in varying degrees 
rather than delegating the power to select their successors to the parties, the introduction 
of presidential term limits does not necessarily signify an immediate shift from a personal 
to a party-based rule in the two countries. Instead, a party-based rule seems to have been 
institutionalised gradually through the experience of several presidential successions. 
The introduction of presidential term limits in Namibia and Mozambique can 
largely be considered as concessions made in historical constitutional negotiations to 
facilitate the countries’ independence or to end the civil war without plans by incoming 
or incumbent presidents to resign from the presidency immediately. Therefore, it is 
uncertain to what extent the introduction of the presidential term limit was originally 
aimed at establishing a leadership rotation mechanism to unite the party elites. Instead, 
party coherence underpinned by leadership rotation was gradually established over time 
in these countries. In line with Cheeseman (2019) and McKie’s (2019) emphasis on the 
importance of electoral trends, the different outcomes of the attempts by Nujoma, 
Chissano and Guebuza to serve for a third term were partly explained by different levels 
of electoral competitiveness in Namibia and Mozambique. Strong party cohesion within 
the ruling party in Mozambique was established because it was critical to beat the strong 
opposition party in the elections. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
Drawing on the experience of the dominant-party rule in Mexico, the present study 
examined whether dominant parties in Africa with regular presidential succession have 
strategically introduced presidential term limits to establish leadership rotation 
mechanisms within their parties and to maintain their dominant rule under the multi-party 
system. The present paper has demonstrated that the aims of the introduction of 
presidential term limits vary among the four dominant-party states. The analysis of the 
four cases suggests that the introduction of presidential term limits in Tanzania and 
Botswana seem to have been aimed at strengthening party coherence through leadership 
rotation. Conversely, the introduction of presidential term limits in Namibia and 
Mozambique was largely a concession made to incorporate opposition forces in the 
formation of the new political system. Despite the variation, a party-based rule with 
relatively strong party coherence has been established in all the four countries over time, 
not merely due to the adoption of a presidential term limit but by other factors such as the 
strengths of opposition parties in elections. The present study also finds that, as part of 
broader constitutional reforms, the introduction of presidential term limits was sometimes 
concessions made by the presidents and ruling parties to opposition forces facing the need 
to accommodate them in the new governing system of their countries. 
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